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LITIGATING AGAINST EMPLOYMENT PENALTIES FOR
PREGNANCY, BREASTFEEDING AND CHILDCARE*
CANDACE SAARI KOVACIC-FLEISCHER**
I. INTRODUCTIONIN the last State of the Union Address before the new millenium, Presi-
dent Bill Clinton proposed a number of reforms for women and for
parents. He called for equal work for equal pay; quality childcare; subsi-
dies for working parents; tax credits for working and stay at home parents;
and expansion of the Family and Medical Leave Act' (FMLA). Most im-
portantly for purposes of this Article he said, "[p] arents should never face
discrimination in the workplace. I will ask Congress to prohibit companies
from refusing to hire or promote workers simply because they have
children."
2
It is probably not a coincidence that those proposals were made to-
gether. They inter-relate. Parenting takes time, and, as society is currently
structured, those time demands fall disproportionately on mothers. Of
course, pregnancy, childbirth and breastfeeding are exclusively functions
of being a woman and may cause women to take leaves from jobs. Lack of
excellent and affordable child care as well as parental choice, may also
cause either fathers or mothers to take leaves from jobs, but more often,
mothers. 3 Until the passage of the FMLA, the first statute that President
* This Article grew out of a speech entitled Litigating Work and Family
Conflicts delivered by Professor Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer on November 7,
1998 at the Thirty-Third Annual Villanova Law Review Symposium honoring the
late MaryJoe Frug, entitled Still Hostile After All These Years? Gender, Work & Family
Revisited.
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University School of Law, 1974. I would like to thank my research assistants, Debra
L. Satinoff and Jennifer A. Brennan, Class of 1999 and my students, Sun Hi Ahn,
Jennifer Brennan, Daphne Fields and David Terbush, Class of 1999 for their
research and editing assistance and/or their insightful comments. In addition, I
would like to thank the American University Washington College of Law Research
Fund for generously assisting with this research.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (Supp. 1 1997).
2. President William Jefferson Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of the
Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 19, 1999), in 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 78, 81 [hereinafter State of the Union]; see also Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer,
United States v. Virginia's New Gender Equal Protection Analysis with Ramifications for
Pregnancy, Parenting, and Title VII, 50 VAND. L. REv. 845, 909 (1997) (recipient of
Washington College of Law's Pauline Ruyle Moore Scholar Award for 1997) (as-
serting that "[b]ecause Congress has had political success with the FMLA, Con-
gress could amend the FMLA or Title VII to provide further workplace
adjustments for parenting.").
3. For a further discussion of the disproportionate impact that inadequate
family employment policies have on women, see infra note 68.
(355)
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Clinton signed into law after it had been vetoed twice by the prior adminis-
tration, no federal law had been interpreted to require employers to pro-
vide job protection for child-related leaves. The FMLA, however, has only
limited coverage, and no federal law requires employers to provide paid
leave for any child-related activity.4 Studies have shown that, without guar-
antees of reemployment taken for pregnancy, unpaid job interruptions,
breastfeeding or childcare have contributed to the pay differential be-
tween men and women. 5 Thus, to eliminate the pay differential and other
discrimination against mothers, President Clinton advocates more vigi-
lance in ensuring equal pay for equal work, and also appears to realize
that without maternity leave benefits and childcare, this will not be
possible.
President Clinton also realizes that parents, and not just mothers,
must be protected from discrimination in the workplace. If benefits are
provided only to mothers, fathers would have to choose between time with
their children or their job success, as mothers now often do; the idea that
only mothers are important in the lives of their children would be perpet-
uated; and there would be continued discrimination against mothers be-
cause they would be viewed as different from fathers.
Not all of what President Clinton proposes is currently unavailable.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,6 as amended by the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act 7 (PDA), prohibits employers from intentionally dis-
criminating against women, including pregnant women, and prohibits em-
ployers from having policies that have that effect.8 As this Article will
demonstrate, however, lack of leaves for pregnancy, breastfeeding and
childcare discriminate against women, but the courts, for the most part,
have not recognized those deficiencies as Title VII violations.9 Despite the
fact that many companies find family-friendly policies cost effective, many
others penalize parents for having or caring for children.1 0
4. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654. Although the FMLA requires employers to pro-
vide certain pregnancy, childcare and other leave, those leaves are limited and
unpaid. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)-(c) (providing for maximum of 12 unpaid weeks
of leave from work for birth of child or to care for ill family member). Moreover,
the FMLA does not cover much of the workplace because only employers who have
50 or more employees are covered. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4) (A) (i). Additionally,
employees eligible for leave under the FMLA must be employed for at least 12
months. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2) (A) (i). The FMLA was the first statute that Presi-
dent Clinton signed into law after it had been vetoed twice by the prior administra-
tion. See State of the Union, supra note 2, at 81; see also Kovavic-Fleischer, supra note 2
at 898-99, 903-04 (discussing limitations and history of FMLA).
5. For a further discussion of the economic impact of job interruption, see
infra note 68 and accompanying text.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
8. For further discussion of Title VII and its amendments, see infra Part lIB.
9. For a further discussion of lower court cases disregarding the protections
of Title VII and the PDA, see Part II, infra, notes 83-194.
10. For further discussion of the cost-effectiveness of family-friendly policies,
see generally Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 2.
356 [Vol. 44: p. 355
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In this Article, I will describe a theory under Title VII that plaintiffs,
both mothers and fathers, can use to challenge some inadequate parental
employment policies, without having to wait for legislation. I derived this
theory from three United States Supreme Court cases and first articulated
it in an earlier article that focused on United States v. Virginia.a"
In that case in 1997, the United States Supreme Court held that Vir-
ginia violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by
excluding women from its all-male public military college.1 2 The Court
also held that the college would need to accommodate, but not to deni-
grate, the "celebrated differences" between the sexes.1 3 Unfortunately,
many lower courts have allowed employers to denigrate women for their
celebrated differences with respect to reproduction, despite these wo-
men's claims that employment penalties have discriminated against them
in violation of Title VII and the PDA.
This Article argues that, based on my theory, such lower court cases
are wrongly decided and conflict with United States v. Virginia1 4 and two
other United States Supreme Court cases-California Savings & Loan As-
soc. v. Guerra,15 and Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC."6
My theory derives elements from each of the three cases: first, United States
v. Virginia's recognition that institutions must accommodate women's cele-
brated differences in order to provide true equality;1 7 second, Guerra's rec-
ognition that pregnancy leaves free women from the necessity of choosing
between having a job and having a child;18 and third, Newport News' ac-
knowledgment that if Title VII's pregnancy discrimination prohibition ap-
11. 518 U.S. 515 (1996); see generally Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 2 (examin-
ing and applying Justice Ginsburg's opinion in United States v. Virginia).
12. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 546 (holding that VMI's "gender-defined classifica-
tion" invalid); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."). See generallyJason
M. Skaggs, Justifying Gender-Based Affirmative Action Under United States v. Virginia's
"Exceedingly Persuasive Justification" Standard, 86 CAL. L. REv. 1169 (1998) (examin-
ing controversy surrounding "exceedingly persuasive justification" standard);
Tracy Eubanks-Dawe, Note, Equal Opportunity at VMI: United States v. Virginia, 116
S.Ct. 2264 (1996), 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 443, 460-66 (1998) (commenting on lower
courts' acceptance of female stereotypes in explaining why rational basis and strict
scrutiny are inappropriate for gender classifications); Deborah A. Widiss, Note, Re-
viewing History: The Use of the Past as Negative Precedent in United States v. Virginia,
108 YALE L.J. 237 (1998) (developing theory of history as negative precedent).
13. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 ("'Inherent differences' between men and
women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for
denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individ-
ual's opportunity.").
14. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
15. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
16. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
17. For a further discussion of the necessity of accommodating celebrated dif-
ferences as expressed in United States v. Virginia, see infra Part IIA, notes 26-47 and
accompanying text.
18. For a further discussion of Guerra's interpretation of Title VII, see infra
Part 1iB, notes 48-78 and accompanying text.
1999]
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plied only to female employees, male employees with families would be
subject to discrimination. 19
My theory is premised on an equality model for men and women that
compares fathers with mothers. It then looks at the societal disparate im-
pact occurring on the latter when workplaces do not take into account
employees' children.
Part II describes this.three-case theory in more detail and concludes
that when women, and not men, have to choose between having a child
and having ajob, women's celebrated differences are denigrated and that
those women are discriminated against because of their sex.2 0 Part II fur-
ther describes how adjustments made for women with children should be
extended to men with children to avoid discrimination against men.
2 1
Part III of this Article describes and critiques a number of lower court
cases, chronologically by category,, that have held that Title VII allows em-
ployers to make women choose between having a child and having a job.
Proponents hailed Title VII as a major victory for women's rights, believ-
ing that it would enable women to compete for jobs on the basis of their
merit, undisadvantaged by their gender. Because, however, men and wo-
men have different physical demands when their children are born and
traditionally have had different roles with respect to child care, a view of
Title VII that ignores these differences prohibits mothers from competing
equally with fathers.22 Part III explains that these lower court cases, penal-
izing women for having children, are in conflict with the three Supreme
Court cases that form the core of my theory.
23
Part IV discusses the few lower court cases that have ruled consistently
with my three-case theory, recognizing the logic of treating men and wo-
men in the biological context of their lives. 24 Part IV also applies the the-
ory to the situations described in Part III, with different results,
concluding that courts can have an appropriate role in restructuring work
and family balance. 25
19. For a further discussion of the Court's view of equality expressed in New-
port News, see infra Part IIC, notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
20. For a further discussion of the impact of Virginia and Guerra on Supreme
Court equal protection jurisprudence, see infra Parts IIA and B, notes 26-78 and
accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion of the implications of Newport News for extending
maternity-related adjustments to fathers, see infra Part IIC, notes 79-89 and accom-
panying text.
22. For a further discussion of differences between mothers and fathers, see
infra notes 90-194 and accompanying text.
23. For a further discussion of the conflict between lower court cases dealing
with Title VII and the Supreme Court opinions in Virginia, Guerra and Newport
News, see infra notes 90-194 and accompanying text.
24. For a further discussion of lower court cases consistent with my three-case
theory, see infra Part IV, notes 228-57 and accompanying text.
25. For further discussion of how courts can apply the three-case theory to
address the tension between work and family requirements, see infra Part IV, notes
228-57 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 44: p. 355
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II. LITIGATION THEORY TO ADJUST FOR "CELEBRATED DIFFERENCES"
A. United States v. Virginia
The Supreme Court first adopted the idea of "celebrated differences"
between the sexes in United States v. Virginia.26 There, the Court held that
Virginia had violated the Fourteenth Amendment by excluding women
from the Commonwealth's only single-sex school. 2 7 Justice Ginsburg, writ-
ing for a majority of sixJustices, used that phrase to identify circumstances
when legislatures could justifiably classify men and women differently. 28
The Court made clear that those classifications could not be used to deni-
grate women and cited past economic discrimination and pregnancy as
situations in which legislatures could appropriately classify by sex. 29 By
stressing that only in narrow circumstances can men and women be
treated differently, Justice Ginsburg appeared to meld together two oppos-
ing arguments among feminists: whether legislatures should treat men
and women identically and afford them equal opportunities, or whether
they should adjust for significant differences between men and women to
allow them to achieve equality.30
The differences at issue in United States v. Virginia were physical
strength and privacy concerns. The case involved a publicly funded all-
male military college, Virginia Military Institute (VMI), which employed
26. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (stating that
"'[i]nherent differences' between men and women, we have come to appreciate,
remain cause for celebration").
27. See id. at 532-33 n.6 (discussing heightened review standard for gender-
based classifications and noting that "[t]he Court has thus far reserved its most
stringent judicial scrutiny for classifications based on race or national origin."). In
gender classification cases, the reviewing court must determine whether the prof-
fered justification is "exceedingly persuasive." See id. at 523 (describing "exceed-
ingly persuasive" standard to require "'at least that the [challenged] classification
serves "important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means em-
ployed" are "substantially related to the achievement of those objectives""').
28. See id. at 533-34 ("Inherent differences between men and women ... re-
main cause for celebration, but not for denigration .... Sex classifications may be
used to compensate women 'for particular economic disabilities [they have] suf-
fered,' to 'promote equal employment opportunity,' to advance full development
of the talent and capacities of our Nation's people. But such classifications may
not be used, as they once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and eco-
nomic inferiority of women.") (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320
(1972) (per curiam) and California Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272,
289 (1987) and citing Goesaert v. Cleary, 355 U.S. 464, 467 (1948)).
29. See id.
30. See id. at 551 n.19 (noting at one point that "the question is whether the
State can constitutionally deny to women who have the will and capacity, the training
and attendant opportunities that VMI uniquely affords" but later acknowledging
that "[a] dmitting women to VMI would undoubtedly require alterations necessary
to afford members of each sex privacy from the other sex in living arrangements,
and to adjust aspects of the physical training programs") (emphasis added). For a
more complete discussion of the different feminist viewpoints, including equal
treatment and equal results theories, as well as Justice Ginsburg's approach in
United States v. Virginia, see Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 2, at 852-66.
1999]
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an "adversative method" of education, which involves a lack of privacy in
the barracks and strenuous physical requirements designed to create "citi-
zen soldiers. '3 1 The Justice Department brought suit against Virginia
claiming that the exclusion of women from VMI violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. 32 The Supreme Court agreed. The Court held that Virginia
failed to prove that the sister program recently instituted in a private wo-
men's school was comparable to VMI, 3 3 that VMI's adversative method was
necessary to achieve the school's goal of creating citizen soldiers or that
admission of women would destroy the adversative method.34 Therefore,
the Court held that VMI must admit women. 35
The Court chose not to rely on its few prior cases involving physical
differences between men and women. Those cases had held that the stat-
utes classifying the sexes differently did not violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment because in those instances men and women were not similarly
situated.36 Although VMI's curriculum involved rigorous physical skills
31. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 522. The extreme pressure placed on cadets as
part of this adversative method, the Court observed, bonds the cadets to their fel-
low sufferers and eventually to their tormentors. See id.
32. See id. at 530. In United States v. Virginia, the United States Department of
Justice filed suit on behalf of a female high school student who wanted to be con-
sidered for admission to VMI. See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407,
1408 (W.D. Va. 1991) (discussing background of complaint). The defendants
were the Commonwealth of Virginia; Governor Wilder; Virginia Military Institute,
its president, superintendent and members of its Board of Visitors; and Virginia's
State Council of Higher Education and its members. See id. at 1408.
33. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 548-54 (noting that sister program developed at
Mary Baldwin College, Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL), lacked
both rigorous military training and military-style living quarters and had inferior
facilities, faculty, courses, admissions criteria and endowments).
34. See id. at 540-46, 542 (noting that district court found, based on stereo-
types of women and men, that admission of women would destroy adversative
method, but concluding that "state actors may not rely on 'overbroad generaliza-
tions to perpetuate historical patterns of discrimination."'). The Court stated the
issue as "not whether 'women-or men-should be forced to attend VMI;' rather,
the question is whether the State can constitutionally deny to women who have the
will and capacity, the training and attendant opportunities that VMI uniquely af-
fords. The notion that admission of women would ...destroy the adversative
method and, with it, even the school, is an ...self-fulfilling prophec[y]; once
routinely used to deny rights or opportunities." Id. at 542-43 (citing Mississippi
Univ..for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982)). The Court ultimately con-
cluded that "Virginia has shown no 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for ex-
cluding all women from the citizen-soldier training afforded by VMI." Id.
35. See id. at 558 (holding VMI's male-only admissions policy unconstitu-
tional); see also id. at 525-26 (citing Virginia, 976 F.2d at 900) (noting that Fourth
Circuit initially gave Virginia the option of privatizing VMI and thus maintaining
its male-only policy)). The Commonwealth chose not to create a women's military
program at a private women's college. See Kovavic-Fleischer, supra note 2, at 867
n.116.
36. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 558-59 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that VMI's
single-sex program was constitutional under "the standard elaboration of interme-
diate scrutiny" appropriate to gender classifications). Justice Scalia, however, ar-
gued that under intermediate scrutiny all that was required was "a substantial
[Vol. 44: p. 355
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and a lack of privacy, the Court did not hold that strength and privacy
differences between men and women justified the exclusion of women.
Nor did the Court simply order that women be admitted to VMI as the
program then existed. Although stressing that the women attending VMI
would need to be capable and willing to meet its strenuous curriculum,
the Court noted that VMI would need to accommodate the differences
between the sexes by adjusting the physical skills requirements and alter-
ing the housing situation. 37 Justice Ginsburg struck a balance in the femi-
nist debate by requiring both that women who attend VMI be capable and
that VMI make institutional alterations to its program.
38
relation between end and means, not a perfect fit. There is simply no support in
our cases for the notion that a sex-based classification is invalid unless it relates to
characteristics that hold true in every instance." Id. at 573 (citing Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981)). Rostker, however, made the standard of intermediate
scrutiny one of first determining whether men and women were "not similarly situ-
ated," saying that "[m]en and women, because of the combat restrictions on wo-
men are simply not similarly situated for purposes of a draft or registration for a
draft." Rostker, 453 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added).
Similar precedents also were apparently disregarded by the United States v. Vir-
ginia Court. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robinson, 463 U.S. 248, 267-68 (1983) (upholding
differential treatment because unmarried mothers and fathers are "not similarly
situated" with respect to adopting children); Michael M. v. Superior Ct., 450 U.S.
464, 470-73 (1981) (holding statutory rape law applicable only to men constitu-
tional because women were punished enough by "inescapably identifiable conse-
quences of teenage pregnancy"); see also Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 2, at 882-83
nn.202-14 (describing difference between United States v. Virginia's and Rostkds
analysis of sex-based discrimination and concluding that "not similarly situated" is
no longer a per sejustification for upholding sex-based classifications).
37. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 551-52 n.19. The Court stated that, "[a]dmitting
women to VMI would undoubtedly require alterations necessary to afford mem-
bers of each sex privacy from the other sex in living arrangements, and to adjust
aspects of the physical training programs." Id. The Court went on to conclude
that, based on the experience at the military academies, "such adjustments are
manageable." Id. (citing A. Vitters et al., U.S. Military Academy, Report of Admission
of Women (Project Athena I-IV) (1977-1980) and DEFENSE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
WOMEN IN THE SERVICES, REPORT ON THE INTEGRATION AND PERFORMANCE OF WO-
MEN AT WEST POINT 17-18 (1992)). For a further discussion of the Court's refer-
ence to military academies, see Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 2, at 865-67 nn.108-16
and accompanying text.
38. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 523 (noting that "'some women are capable of all
of the individual activities required of VMI cadets,' and 'can meet the physical
standards [VMI] now impose [s] on men"' but also discussing alterations to VMI's
program "necessary to adjust aspects of the physical training program"); see also
Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 2, at 858-66 (describing how Justice Ginsburg com-
bined equal treatment theory-requiring women who want to attend VMI to be
capable-with equal results theory-requiring VMI to make adjustments to accom-
modate capable women). For a further discussion of the difference between equal
treatment and equal results feminist theories, see Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 2,
at 852-58.
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Justice Ginsburg was careful to note that legislative classifications that
differentiate between the sexes cannot denigrate women.3 9 She thus dis-
tanced herself from older cases such as Muller v. Oregon,40 which upheld
legislation to "protect" women, but not men, from some rigors of the
workplace, but also had the effect of making women's work less valuable. 41
Avoiding the approach in Muller, United States v. Virginia appears to order
institutional alterations and adjustments to VMI, not to provide women
with "special treatment," but to redesign an institution that had been un-
necessarily designed for men only.4 2
The celebrated differences accommodated in the VMI case are analo-
gous to pregnancy and parenting differences. Upper body strength is a
physical characteristic, as is the potential to become pregnant and have a
child. Privacy concerns are a combination of physical and cultural charac-
teristics, as are parenting obligations. Parenting may include breastfeed-
ing, which can only be performed by mothers, and also other care-giving
activities, which are not biologically restricted to mothers. The division of
this latter group of activities between mothers and others typically has
been structured by society, and this structure has remained generally en-
trenched. 43 If equality under the Fourteenth Amendment requires VMI
not merely to admit women but also to accommodate their admission,
then equality under Title VII (whose definition of equality follows the con-
stitutional definition) 44 should require the workplace not merely to admit
women, but also to adjust for them as well. 45 Under this model, mothers
would be compared with fathers. If one group faces the loss of a job or
income upon the birth of the child, but the other group does not, the
groups are not equal.46 If women can have the same opportunities in the
workplace as men only if they do not have children, then gender equality
has not been achieved. The Court articulated this realization in California
39. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534 (stating that "[sex] classifications may not be
used, as they once were ... to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic
inferiority of women") (citing Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948)).
40. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
41. See id. at 421-22 (holding that state law limiting working hours for women,
but not men, in laundry business was justified because women needed to preserve
their health for bearing children).
42. See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 2, at 863-65 (commenting that United
States v. Virginia essentially examines how VMI could have been designed to maxi-
mize talents of both men and women).
43. See id. at 892-98 (discussing how pregnancy and parenting, including
breastfeeding, are analogous to celebrated differences of strength and privacy ac-
commodated in United States v. Virginia).
44. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 133-34 (1976) (holding con-
stitutional and Title VII standard "coterminous").
45. See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 2, at 888-91 (relying on implication in
Guerra that pregnancy leave is required, not merely permitted, by Title VII).
46. For authorities describing policies that disadvantage women, but not men,
for having children, see Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 2, at 854 n.39, 888 n.243.
[Vol. 44: p. 355
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Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Guerra,4 7 which supports the view of equal-
ity derived from United States v. Virginia.
B. California Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Guerra
The second case in this three-case theory is Guerra, a decision based
on Tide VII rather than the Constitution. Title VII prohibits employers
whose businesses affect interstate commerce and who have fifteen or more
employees from discriminating on the basis of sex and other categories.
48
Title VII prohibits both discriminatory treatment and discriminatory
effects.
49
Under what is referred to as the disparate treatment theory, an em-
ployer cannot treat a woman differently because she is a woman, nor treat
a man differently because he is a man. 50 If the employer does, then the
remedy can be damages and/or a court order to the employer to reinstate
the employee or to pay back or front pay.5 1 Disparate treatment can often
be proved by comparing an employer's treatment of one sex with the treat-
ment of the other sex. A lack of a comparison group, however, will not
necessarily defeat a claim of discrimination because of the system of pre-
sumptions established by the United States Supreme Court.
5 2
47. 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987).
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994). This section provides that:
[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail
or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or class-
ify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such indi-
viduals race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
49. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36
n.15 (1977) (distinguishing between disparate treatment where "employer simply
treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion,
sex or national origin" from disparate impact where "employment practices that
are facially neutral in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot
be justified by business necessity") (emphasis added).
50. See id. (noting that, among other things, employers may not treat employ-
ees "less favorably" simply based on their sex).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981A (1994) (providing compensatory and/or punitive
damages for intentional violations of Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994)
(providing equitable remedies for employment discrimination under Title VII).
52. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973) (es-
tablishing three-part framework for proving disparate treatment in which plaintiff
must meet four-prong prima facie case of discrimination-that plaintiff was mem-
ber of protected class, was qualified, rejected and job remained open; burden of
production then shifts to defendant to articulate "legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason" for employer's decision; and, finally, plaintiff has opportunity to prove that
employer's articulated reason was mere pretext). See generally St. Mary's Honor
Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993) (suggesting that plaintiff's proof of pretext
may not be enough to prove discrimination but rather that "the fact finder must
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Under the disparate impact theory, an employee must prove that a
neutral employment practice caused a disproportionate impact on a class
protected by Title VII. Although an employer may be able to justify the
practice at issue as a business necessity, a plaintiff then has the opportunity
to prove that there is a less discriminatory practice that will achieve the
same end.53 The employee need not prove that the employer intended to
discriminate by its use of the challenged practice. 54 The remedy is an eq-
uitable order to eliminate or change the practice, and this order will affect
all employees. 55 Typically disparate impact is proved through a variety of
statistical methods.5 6 The cases described in Part III that reject disparate
believe the plaintiffs explanation of intentional discrimination"); Price Water-
house v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (establishing that defendant has burden of
proving that same action would be taken if there had been no discrimination
where both discrimination and legitimate rationale have been proved); Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (holding that once
plaintiff proves prima facie case of disparate treatment, defendant may rebut pre-
sumption of discrimination by merely providing evidence, but not necessarily per-
suading court, that employer "was actually motivated by the proffered reasons");
Candace S. Kovacic-Fleischer, Proving Discrimination after Price Waterhouse and
Ward's Cove: Semantics as Substance, 39 AM. U. L. Rxv. 615, 635-58 (1990) (provid-
ing detailed analysis of burden of production and allocation of proof requirements
in pre-1990 Title VII disparate treatment and disparate impact cases).
53. See The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (1994)
(codifying disparate impact theory according to its delineation in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)). That Act provides:
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is estab-
lished under this subchapter only if-(i) a complaining party demon-
strates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that
causes a disparate impact on thebasis of race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged
practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with
business necessity.
Id.; see also id. (providing that "[a]n unlawful employment practice ... is estab-
lished . . .(ii) [if] the complaining party makes the demonstration described in
subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment practice and the re-
spondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice").
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2) ("A demonstration that an employment
practice is required by business necessity may not be used as a defense against a
claim of intentional discrimination .. "); see also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321, 328-29 (1977) (noting "the claim that the statutory height and weight require-
ments discriminate against women does not involve an assertion of purposeful dis-
criminatory motive."); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (noting
that under disparate impact theory of discrimination "good intent or absence of
discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures ... that operate as
'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job
capability").
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides that its
compensatory and punitive remedies are not applicable to disparate impact claims.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1981A(a)(1)-(2).
56. See BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA-
TION LAw 88-103 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing statistical method used in disparate
impact cases). See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SEcTION OF LABOR AND EM-
PLOYMENT LAw, BuREAu OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS (Washington D.C. 1996) (describing
methods of proving adverse impact).
-[Vol. 44: p. 355
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impact claims either do not understand the claims 57 or use a pinched view
of workplace statistics. 58 Many courts, however, including the United
States Supreme Court, "caution that a plaintiff is not required to produce
perfect evidence of adverse impact."59 For example, in Dothard v. Rawlin-
son,60 national statistics demonstrated that height and weight restrictions
for applicants seeking prison guard jobs in Alabama had a disproportion-
ate impact on women. 61
In this broad respect my three-case theory is similar to Dothards dispa-
rate impact analysis, but my theory does not require statistical proof;
rather, it looks at the impact practices, such as denying leaves for preg-
nancy or denying accommodations for breastfeeding or childcare as soci-
ety is currently structured, have on women in general. Lack of leaves and
other adjustments for childcare can affect all women who might have or
adopt a child or who have children needing care. Lack of these policies
may also have affected women who have grown children or chose not to
have children, by influencing their family-size or job-related decisions.
And, lack of these policies may also discourage men from spending more
time with their families, which exacerbates the dilemma for women.
Title VII was amended in 1978 by the PDA.62 Congress passed that
Act to overturn General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,63 which held that excluding
pregnancy benefits from an employee's benefit program was not discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex. 6 4 Following its constitutional counterpart,
57. See Troupe v. May Dep't Stores, 20 F.3d 734, 738-39 (7th Cir. 1994). For a
further discussion of Troupe, see infra notes 111-23 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927, 931-32 (4th Cir. 1988) (refusing
to compare men with illnesses granted six month or more leaves with women nurs-
ing children); Payseur v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., Nos. 88-C5707, 88-5708, 1989 WL
152583, *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 1989) (basing decision on thirteen people);
Marafino v. St. Louis County Cir. Ct., 537 F. Supp. 206, 213 (E.D. Mo. 1982) (not-
ing that 4 out of 10 employees were women). For a discussion of Marafino, see
infra notes 99-110 and accompanying text; Barrash, notes 163-72 and accompany-
ing text; and Payseur, notes 208-20.
59. LINDEMAN & GROSSMAN, supra note 56, at 88 (citing Supreme Court cases
supporting the caution that perfect statistics are not needed).
60. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
61. See id. at 329-30 ("There is no requirement ... that a statistical showing of
disproportionate impact must always be based on analysis of the characteristics of
actual applicants .... [R]eliance on general population demographic data was
not misplaced where there was no reason to suppose that ... characteristics of
Alabama men and women differ markedly from those of the national
population.").
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994) ("The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the
basis of sex' include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of preg-
nancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by preg-
nancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in
their ability or inability to work ....").
63. 429 U.S. 125 (1976); see also Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.
v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678-82 (discussing legislative history of PDA).
64. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145-46.
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Geduldig v. Aiello,65 the Gilbert Court reasoned that discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy is not discrimination on the basis of sex because the
classification of pregnant versus nonpregnant people includes both men
and women in the second category.66 The PDA defines discrimination on
the basis of sex to include discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and
also says that pregnant women should be treated the same as others simi-
lar in their ability or inability to work.67 Despite the prohibition of dis-
crimination on the basis of pregnancy, more women than men appear to
leave the workplace after the birth of a child.68 As the cases described in
Part III demonstrate, this is often the result of employer practices that
penalize pregnancy leaves or deny breastfeeding or childrearing leaves.
The ability to have a child and to breastfeed, however, are two of the "cele-
brated" reproductive roles in which men and women are not alike. 69 The
failure of the workplace to accommodate those roles forces women, but
not men, to make choices with respect to their jobs and their biology.
In United States v. Virginia, the Supreme Court cited Guerra as an ex-
ample of a legislature properly classifying persons according to their sex. 70
Guerra involved a California statute that requires employers to give their
employees up to four months of unpaid pregnancy leave for physical disa-
65. 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974) (rejecting constitutional equal protec-
tion challenge to California's disability insurance program that excluded coverage
for disabilities related to normal pregnancy and childbirth because classifications
were not based on gender, but rather "pregnant women and nonpregnant per-
sons," the second group of which "included members of both sexes") (citing
Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20).
66. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 125, 135-40 (rejecting Title VII challenge to em-
ployer's disability plan that excluded coverage for disabilities related to normal
pregnancy and childbirth because of reasoning in Geduldig).
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
68. See Martha E. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Wo-
men's Work Through Premarital Security Agreements, 77 TEx. L. REv. 17, 112 n.6 (1998)
(showing that fewer mothers of young children work in labor force than other
women and men and that mothers are likely to have sporadic or part-time employ-
ment where wages are lower and opportunities are limited in order to accommo-
date their childrearing responsibilities); Angie K. Young, Assessing the Family and
Medical Leave Act in Terms of Gender Equality, Work/Family Balance, and the Needs of
Children, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 113, 115-16 (1998) (noting that more than one-
half of all working women have left work force at least once for family reasons,
while only one percent of men have left work force for such reasons) (citing
DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 174 (1989)); see also Kovacic-Fleischer,
supra note 2, at 855 n.43 (summarizing studies showing that job interruption nega-
tively impacts salaries of women).
69. See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 2, at 892-98 (discussing how pregnancy
and parenting, including breastfeeding, are analogous to celebrated differences of
strength and privacy accommodated in United States v. Virginia).
70. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (stating that sex-
based classifications may be used to "promot[e] equal employment opportunity")
(quoting California Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987) (alter-
ation in original)).
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bilities.7 1 A bank that refused to reinstate a receptionist after her preg-
nancy leave sued the state agency that enforced the statute; the bank
claimed that the statute was preempted by the PDA because the statute
provided better treatment for pregnant women than for similarly situated
disabled, nonpregnant persons.72 The Supreme Court held that the stat-
ute was not preempted, noting that the PDA had been passed to prevent
the exclusion of pregnancy from employee benefits plans.73 The Court
held that Congress had not intended to foreclose favorable treatment for
pregnant women, but concluded instead that "Congress intended the PDA
to be 'a floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not drop-
not a ceiling above which they may not rise.' 74 Justice Marshall, writing
for the majority, described the rationale underlying the Court's holding,
"[b]y 'taking pregnancy into account,' California's pregnancy disability-
leave statute allows women, as well as men, to have families without losing
their jobs."75 Thus, it appears to follow from this statement that Title VII
requires pregnancy leaves. This statement is also consistent with the equal-
ity model derived from United States v. Virginia.76 If, however, this analysis
were limited only to helping women, it could perhaps be criticized as a
return to Muller v. Oregon, where the Court's protectionist attitude toward
women ultimately hindered women in the workplace. 77 Therefore, the
last case in the three-case theory, Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.
v. EEOC, 78 must be added.
C. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC
Newport News uses a two-step approach to equality. The case involved
an employer who, prior to the passage of the PDA, had a health insurance
plan that limited the amount that employees and spouses of employees
could recover for pregnancy-related medical costs. 79 After the effective
date of the PDA, the employer amended its insurance plan and removed
the limit on benefits for pregnant employees, but not for pregnant
71. See Guerra, 479 U.S. at 275; CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945(b) (2) (West 1980)
(requiring employers to reinstate employees returning from no more than four
months pregnancy or disability leave unless job is no longer available due to busi-
ness necessity); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (Supp. 11997). The California stat-
ute predated the FMLA. For a further discussion of the FMLA, see supra note 4.
72. See Guerra, 479 U.S. at 279, 286.
73. See id. at 288-89.
74. Id. at 285 (quoting Guerra v. California Federal Savings & Loan Assoc., 758
F.2d 390, 396 (9th Cir. 1985)).
75. Id. at 289.
76. For a further discussion of the equality model as it is reflected in the
United States v. Virginia case, see supra notes 26-47 and accompanying text.
77. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1908) (describing women as
physically inferior to men, and therefore dependent on men to protect their re-
productive health as well as shield them from men's "greed" and "passion").
78. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
79. See id. at 670-71.
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spouses of male employees.8 0 The Court held that, although the PDA re-
ferred only to employees, the general Title VII protection against discrimi-
nation required that a male employee's family benefits package not be less
than that of a female employee.81 Thus, the Court's first step was to en-
sure adjustments in the workplace to prevent pregnancy discrimination
under the PDA; its second step was to adjust workplace policies to prevent
discrimination against men under the general prohibition against sex dis-
crimination under Section 703(a) of Title VII.82
My three-case theory also adopted a two-step approach to equality in
the workplace. Accommodations for women's reproduction and childcare
differences must be made for women to be equal to men in the workplace,
and these accommodations, such as leave during childbirth and childcare
leaves, must be extended to men so that they will be equal with women in
the workplace.
Some lower courts, both before and after Newport News, have recog-
nized that men must receive family rights equal to those of women. In
1990, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Schafer v.
Board of Public Education83 reversed a summary judgment motion in favor
of a teacher's union whose collective bargaining agreement provided ma-
ternity, but not paternity, leave.8 4 In 1972, just as the Supreme Court had
begun to hold that the Equal Protection Clause protects women, 85 the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in Dan-
ielson v. Board of Higher Education8 6 refused to rule as a matter of law that
80. See id.
81. See id. at 684 ("[T]he husbands of female employees receive a specified
level of hospitalization coverage for all conditions; the wives of male employees
receive such coverage for all conditions except for pregnancy-related conditions
.... Thus petitioner's plan unlawfully gives married male employees a benefit
package for their dependents that is less inclusive than the dependency coverage
provided to married female employees.").
82. See id. (setting forth two-step analysis). The Court reasoned: (1) under
the PDA, discrimination based on pregnancy is discrimination based on sex and,
therefore, it is prohibited under Title VII; and (2) "since the sex of the spouse is
always the opposite of the sex of the employee, it follows inexorably that discrimi-
nation against female spouses in the provision of fringe benefits is also discrimina-
tion against male employees." Id.
83. 903 F.2d 243 (3d Cir. 1990).
84. See id. at 244-45, 24748 (noting that year-long childrearing leave could
not be justified as accommodation exclusively for women because childrearing is
not normal disability resulting from "pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions").
85. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding that policy
allowing male military personnel to obtain benefits for their wives, but denying
female personnel benefits for their husbands unless they could prove that they
provided at least one-half of husband's support, violated Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding that state law favoring
fathers over mothers to administer child's estate without "fair and substantial" rela-
tionship to purpose of statute violated Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause).
86. 358 F. Supp. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
[Vol. 44: p. 355
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leave for childrearing could constitutionally be limited to women.8 7 Two
years later, the same district in Ackerman v. Board of Education88 noted that
the Bylaws of New York's Board of Education had been amended to pro-
vide paternity leave as well as maternity leave, and reserved for trial proof
of monetary damages for the father who had been denied paternity leave
prior to that amendment.8 9
III. EMPLOYMENT PENALTIES FOR PREGNANCY, BREASTFEEDING
AND CHILDREARING
Many courts, other than the United States Supreme Court, have held
that employers can penalize women for pregnancy, breastfeeding and chil-
drearing. Many of these penalties are a result of employers and courts
focusing on the second clause of the PDA that says, "and women affected
by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated
the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of bene-
fits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but
similar in their ability or inability to work."90 The employers and courts
also focus on EEOC guidelines and statements in the legislative history
that the PDA will not require employers to provide leaves or benefits if
none are provided.9 1 There is also, however, a first clause that defines
"the terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' [to] include, but are not
limited to because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions .... -92 and an EEOC Guideline that provides that in-
87. See id. at 26-27 (explaining that summaryjudgment against father was not
proper when issues of material fact remained unresolved, including whether fe-
male, but not male, employees of school system were entitled to three semesters of
leave to care for their newborn children absent medical disability related to
pregnancy).
88. 372 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
89. See id. at 277. But cf. Cooper v. Drexel Chem. Co., 949 F. Supp. 1275, 1280
(N.D. Miss. 1996) (holding employer did not violate PDA by terminating father for
taking paternity leave because employer had no written maternity leave policy and
employee "did not have any independent right to take leave time because of his
wife's medical condition"). Additionally the court in Cooper found that the em-
ployee's eight-month term of employment made him ineligible for benefits under
the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a) (1) (A). See id. at 1280 n.2. For a discussion of the
FMLA, see supra note 4.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
91. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.18A (1978) (stating that "leave for childcare purposes
is not covered by the [PDA] . . . leave for childcare [should] be granted on the
same basis as leave which is granted to employees for other non-medical reasons");
H. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4753 (stating "if
a woman wants to stay home to take care of the child, no benefit must be paid
because this is not a medically determined condition related to pregnancy"); see
also Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 2, at 899-902 (reviewing legislative history of
PDA, and suggesting that legislative history is in conflict with the purpose of PDA
be reinterpreted or ignored).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
1999]
15
Kovacic-Fleischer: Litigating against Employment Penalties for Pregnancy, Breastfeed
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
VILLANovA LAW REVIEW
adequate leave could have a disparate impact.93 In addition, there is legis-
lative history, quoted with approval in Guerra, that says that Title VII and
the PDA were intended to end requiring women to choose between work
and family.94 These were summarized in 1993 by one district court, in
Crnokrak v. Evangelical Health Systems Corp., that said:
Looking at the second clause of the PDA, one might infer that
disability leave policies are immune from attack under Title VII if
they treat all disabilities identically. If that were so, however,
then the PDA would have expanded the rights of some pregnant
women asserting disparate treatment claims only to abrogate the
rights of other pregnant women asserting disparate impact
claims.95
After discussing the unanimity among the Justices in Gilbert about "the pos-
sibility of establishing disparate impact claims based on benefits policies
toward pregnant women, '96 and after quoting from Guerra, saying,
"'[g] iven that the PDA was designed to guarantee women the basic right
to participate fully and equally in the workforce, without denying them the
fundamental right to full participation in family life,'" 9 7 the same court
said, "it is hardly possible that Congress sought to strip pregnant women of
rights that they formerly had been granted. Thus, the legislative history of
the PDA, as well as the history of Title VII in general, establish that Con-
gress understood that in some cases 'equality cannot be achieved by treat-
93. See C.F.R. § 1604.10(c) (1979) (providing that "[w]here the termination
of an employee who is temporarily disabled is caused by an employment policy
under which insufficient or no leave is available, such a termination violates the
Act if it has a disparate impact on employment of one sex and is not justified by
business necessity").
94. One of the sponsors of the PDA, Senator Williams said, "The entire thrust
... behind this legislation is to guarantee women the basic right to participate fully
and equally in the workforce, without denying them the fundamental right to full
participation in family life." Guerra, 479 U.S. at 288 (quoting 123 CONG. REC.
29658 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1977) (statement of Sen. Williams)). A Congressperson
said, "Title VII and the PDA are designed to 'put an end to an unrealistic and
unfair system that forces women to choose between family and career.'" 124
CONG. REc. 21442 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Tsongas). Another said, "the PDA
gives a woman the right.., to be financially and legally protected before, during
and after her pregnancy." 124 CONG. REc. 38574 (1978) (remarks of Rep.
Sarasin).
95. Crnokrak v. Evangelical Health Sys. Corp., 819 F. Supp. 737, 741, 743-45
(N.D. Il. 1993). Crnokrak had denied the motion for summary judgment with re-
spect to the disparate treatment claim of the employee who was replaced while on
pregnancy leave. See id. at 743. Despite the language approving disparate impact
pregnancy theories, the court granted the employer's motion with respect to the
disparate impact claim because plaintiffs long pregnancy leave due to complica-
tions made her an atypical pregnant woman and she offered no statistics showing
that women were disadvantaged by the employer's leave policy. See id. at 744-45.
96. Id. at 741-42 (citing Gilbert and concurring or dissenting opinions).
97. Id. at 742 (quoting Guerra, outing remarks of Sen. Williams (23 CONG.
REc. 29658 (1977)).
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ing identically those who are not alike."' 9 8 The cases that follow
demonstrate the inequality that can result when courts do not understand
that view of equality.
A. Pregnancy
Some courts have penalized women for being or having been preg-
nant. For example, in 1983, in Marafino v. St. Louis County Circuit Court,99
an applicant was denied employment as a staff attorney because she was
going to need four to eight weeks of pregnancy leave.' 00 The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, affirmed by the
Eighth Circuit found no disparate treatment because the court found that
defendant's reason for not hiring plaintiff was not pretextual. The em-
ployer had claimed it could not hire someone who would need any leave
soon after having been hired because that leave would interfere with train-
ing.10 1 The court also found no disparate impact against pregnant women
because one of the staff attorneys who had been working for the employer
before becoming pregnant had been permitted to take a pregnancy
leave. 10 2 Rather, the court noted again that the "length and timing" of the
leave sought, not the pregnancy, had influenced the employer's
decision. 10
3
The court further considered whether the employer's "policy of refus-
ing to hire those who planned to take an early leave of absence had a
disparate impact on women in general. 10 4 Because four out of the ten
individuals who were employed as staff attorneys were women, the court
found no statistical evidence to support a theory of disparate effect.
10 5
Noting that, one might presume that "women, more often than men, are
in a position to know that they will require leaves of absence from work"
from the facts that: (1) women and men are subject to most of the same
illnesses and surgeries and (2) "[w]omen are subject to the occasional
physical condition of pregnancy and ... childbirth" the court nonetheless
concluded that it "cannot simply imagine disparate impact. In the total
98. Id. at 742 (quoting Melissa Feinberg, After California Fed. Sav. & Loan
Assoc. v. Guerra: The Parameters of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 31 Aiz. L. REV.
141, 146 (1989)).
99. 537 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mo. 1982), affd, 707 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983).
Complicated pregnancies, however, are still pregnancies. Inadequate leave for
complicated pregnancies discriminates against all women because no woman
knows ahead of time what her pregnancy will be like. If only uncomplicated
pregnancies are protected, then women's "choice" to have a child could be af-
fected by the fact that she might lose her job if she cannot return to work in six or
fewer weeks.
100. See id. at 208-09.
101. See id. at 212.
102. See id. at 212-13.
103. See id. at 212.
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absence of any evidence that women do, in fact, request lengthy leaves of
absence more frequently than men, the court cannot conclude that dispa-
rate impact has been shown."1 0 6
With this narrow description of the evidence required to prove dispa-
rate impact, the court did not address the issue that it had framed-
whether applicants needing leaves early in their employment might dis-
proportionately be pregnant women. One would think that judicial notice
could be taken of the fact that if a pregnant woman is applying for a job,
she knows that she will need a leave early in her employment.10 7 If, there-
fore, an early maternity leave is grounds for rejecting pregnant applicants,
it will be impossible for pregnant women to obtain jobs, and women will
therefore be discriminated against because of pregnancy. Note that the
court uses the word "occasional" to refer to childbirth. Although child-
birth may be occasional for each woman, in the aggregate, approximately
eighty-five percent of women will have children. 10 8 Ignoring the aggre-
gate impact of employment penalties for childbirth ignores the discrimi-
natory effect of those penalties.
The court in Marafino went one step further and alternatively held
that even if there were a disparate impact, the employer had demonstrated
that its policy was a business necessity because plaintiff's early leave would
have had a "sizable impact" on the department where she would have
worked. 10 9 Oddly, however, the court had used the fact of another staff
attorney taking maternity leave to negate a finding of disparate impact. 110
Why was not that same "sizable impact" a business necessity to require dis-
missing her as well? In the next cases discussed, however, most of the
courts found no discrimination and thus did not even consider the affirm-
ative defense of business necessity.
Eleven years later, in Troupe v. May Department Stores Co.,111 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the PDA did not
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. Cf Ilhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151, 1156-57 (7th Cir. 1997)
(holding that to take judicial notice of issue, such as that most part-time workers
are women, "that fact must be indisputable ... and the decades-old conclusions of
the studies . . . present[ed] are certainly subject to dispute") (citing Hennessy v.
Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344, 1354 (7th Cir. 1995)). The elimina-
tion of part-time work, even if it were a policy and not a one time occurrence,
disproportionately impacted women with young children because the statistical
studies plaintiff relied upon were possibly outdated. See id. at 1156-57. The physi-
cal reality of pregnancy and childbirth, however, should not require statistical
proof.
108. See Edward J. McCaffery, Taxing Women: How the Tax Code Discriminates
Against Women and Families, CAL. LAw., Apr. 1997, at 41 (noting that approximately
90% of women in United States get married and 85% have children).
109. See Marafino, 537 F. Supp. at 214.
110. See id. at 212-13.
111. 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994). See generally Maganuco v. Leydon Commu-
nity High Sch. Dist. 212, 939 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that school policy
prohibiting employees from combining paid medical leave, including maternity
leave, did not violate PDA).
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prohibit an employer from terminating a salesperson for excessive tardi-
ness due to morning sickness nor from terminating her because she might
not return from maternity leave. 1 12 The employee had been terminated
one day before her partially compensated maternity leave was to begin.113
She claimed that she had been discriminated against because of her preg-
nancy, but the district court granted the employer's summary judgment
motion. 114
In affirming, the Seventh Circuit identified three types of circumstan-
tial evidence of intentional discrimination that a plaintiff may rely upon to
demonstrate disparate treatment: inferential evidence, comparative evi-
dence and pretextual evidence.1 15 The court said that the plaintiff
presented no comparative evidence about other employees and could not
prove pretext because her tardiness made her unqualified. 116 The court
did not consider as inferential evidence that she was fired for morning
sickness tardiness one day before her maternity leave because she did not
prove that the employer treated nonpregnant employees who were tardy
or planning lengthy leaves less severely. 117 The court appears to be com-
bining comparative evidence with inferential evidence. By doing so, the
court has read "pregnancy" out of the PDA and interpreted it to mean that
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is on the basis of sex only if there
is a nonpregnant person in the employer's workplace with similar needs
receiving better treatment. This is the result foretold one year earlier in
Crnokrak by the district court, which had said, "If [disability leave policies
are immune from attack under Title VII if employers treat all disabilities
identically] then the PDA would have expanded the rights of some preg-
nant women asserting disparate treatment claims only to abrogate the
rights of other pregnant women asserting disparate impact claims." 118
The Seventh Circuit justified drawing a conclusion from the lack of a
comparison class of nonpregnant but otherwise similarly situated employ-
112. See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 737.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 737, 739.
115. See id. at 736 (describing inferential evidence as "suspicious timing, am-
biguous statements oral or written, behavior toward or comments directed at other
employees in the protected group, and other bits and pieces"; comparative evi-
dence as evidence, "whether or not rigorously statistical," that other employees
similarly situated to plaintiff received better treatment; and pretextual evidence as
evidence suggesting that employer's proffered reason for differential treatment is
mere pretext for discrimination).
116. See id. at 736-37. The court is referring to the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work of proof. For a discussion of that framework, see supra note 52.
117. See id. at 738 (suggesting that if employer would have fired nonpregnant
employee about to take protracted leave for medical reasons, it would imply that
employer did not fire plaintiff on basis of pregnancy but rather fired plaintiff for
her tardiness and impending leave because she "cost the company more than she
was worth").
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ees, insisting that "[w] e doubt that finding a comparison group would be
that difficult."119 As will be seen, in the next case discussed the Third
Circuit recognized that finding such a group is, in fact, difficult.
1 20
The Seventh Circuit also dismissed a disparate impact claim in Troupe,
stating that "properly understood, disparate impact as a theory of liability
is a means of dealing with the residues of past discrimination, rather than
a warrant for favoritism."1 2 1 Disparate impact analysis, however, does not
require any proof of intentional discrimination, residual or otherwise.
122
Finally, without having the benefit of United States v. Virginia and with-
out discussing Guerra or Newport News, the court held that "[t]he Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act does not, despite the urgings of feminist
scholars ... require employers to offer maternity leave or take other steps
to make it easier for pregnant women to work.., to make it as easy, say, as
it is for their spouses to continue working during pregnancy."' 23 As de-
scribed in Part II, however, "feminist scholar" Dean Kay is correct that the
appropriate comparison group is not the spouses of the female employees,
but their male counterparts in their workplace. Male employees can have
children without needing physical accommodations and, as the penalty in
this case illustrates, are probably less likely to take months of leave. With
the proper comparison group, my three-case theory supports the theories
of "feminist scholars" dismissed by the Seventh Circuit.
In 1997, the Third Circuit in In re Carnegie Center Assoc.,124 citing
Troupe, held that an employer could dismiss a secretary on maternity leave
rather than determine the comparative qualifications of its staff when
making an economically justified reduction in force.125 The court said
that to prove discrimination, the employee had to demonstrate that the
employer would have treated a nonpregnant person on leave dissimilarly,
even though, contrary to the Seventh Circuit's statement in Troupe,12 6 the
Third Circuit recognized that "it was difficult for her to make such a show-
ing because Carnegie never had an employee on disability leave for a pro-
119. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 739.
120. For a discussion of In re Carnegie, see infra notes 124-129 and accompany-
ing text.
121. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738 (citing Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 967
F.2d 1161, 1164 (7th Cir. 1992)).
122. For authority that employer intent is irrelevant under a disparate impact
theory, see supra note 54 and accompanying text.
123. Crnokrak, 819 F. Supp. at 738 (citing Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Differ-
ence: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 30-31 (1985)). By rejecting
Professor Kay's theory, the court rejected, sub silencio, the dictum in Crnokrak, 819
F. Supp. at 741, that had referred to Professor Kay's theory as "another formula-
tion" of liability under Title VII. For a further discussion of Crnokrak, see supra
notes 95-98.
124. 129 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 1997).
125. See id. at 297 (stating that employer can consider employee's absence in
making adverse employment decisions).
126. See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 739 ("We doubt that finding a comparison group
would be that difficult.").
374 [Vol. 44: p. 355
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tracted period for a reason other than pregnancy. ' 12 7 One would think
that this lack of a comparison group is itself evidence of disparate impact.
The Third Circuit further stated that "the PDA is a shield against dis-
crimination, not a sword in the hands of a pregnant employee," and that
"[t]he PDA does not require fairness." 128 But the "shield" of the PDA in
this case did not prohibit a pregnant woman from being singled out for
unfavorable treatment, and it seems odd that fairness and prevention of
discrimination are not synonymous.
129
During that same year, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reached a similar result, but with some deprecatory lan-
guage. In Piantanida v. Wyman Center, Inc., °3 0 a woman who was demoted
to a lower payingjob after returning from maternity leave claimed that her
employers' executive director "told her that she was being given a position
'for a new mom to handle.""31 She declined the new job because it paid
only half of her original salary; the individual who eventually filled the new
job, however, received the same salary as plaintiff had in her original
job.'3 2 The employer sought summary judgment on the ground that the
status of a "new mom" is not protected by the PDA.133 The trial court
granted the motion, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.'
3 4
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that caring for a new child is not a medi-
cal condition related to pregnancy, but rather "is a social role chosen by
all new parents who make the decision to raise a child."' 3 5 The court
pointed out that "new parents" include not only women who give birth to
127. Carnegie, 129 F.3d at 297 (relying on Troupe and distinguishing Smith v.
FW. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 1996), and holding that employee was fired
during pregnancy leave not because of'pregnancy but because job became super-
fluous); see also Victoria R. Riede, Employer Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy:
Righting the Power Imbalance, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 223, 230-42, 247-50 (1997)
(describing Smith and recommending that expansion of FMLA to provide 180 day
leave would have protected her job).
128. Carnegie, 129 F.3d at 297.
129. See Judith G. Greenberg, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act: Legitimating
Discrimination Against Pregnant Women in the Workforce, 50 ME. L. REv. 225, 225
(1998) (describing pregnancy discrimination and arguing that PDA is "a shield
behind which employers can hide as they discriminate").
130. 116 F.3d 340 (8th Cir. 1997).
131. Id. at 341 (noting that demotion was not result of failure to return to
work) (citations omitted).
132. See id.
133. See id. at 340. Cf Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1487, 1492-
93 (D. Colo. 1997) (stating that "[t]he [PDA] does not specify whether the dis-
crimination must occur during pregnancy. However,- to read Title VII so narrowly
would lead to absurd results such as 'prohibit[ing] an employer from firing a wo-
man during her pregnancy but permitfing] the employer to terminate her the day
after delivery if the reason for termination was that the woman became pregnant
in the first place.' The plain language of the statute does not require plaintiff to
be pregnant when the alleged discrimination occurs." (citing Donaldson v. American
Banco Corp., 945 F. Supp. 1456, 1463-64 (D. Colo. 1996))).
134. See Piantanida, 116 F.3d at 340.
135. Id. at 342.
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children, but also men who biologically become fathers, as well as men
and women who adopt.1 3 6 This plaintiff, however, was not asking for chil-
drearing leave; in fact, she had returned to work after having a baby.
13 7
The status of "new mom" will always follow a pregnancy, assuming a live
birth. The Eighth Circuit concluded that "(a] n employer's discrimination
against an employee who has accepted this parental role-reprehensible as
this discrimination might be--is therefore not based on the gender-specific
biological functions of pregnancy and child-bearing, but rather is based
on a gender-neutral status potentially possessible by all employees, includ-
ing men and women who will never be pregnant."1 3 8 The court did not
inquire, and probably plaintiff did not think she had to prove, whether the
employer also demoted "new dads" in order to treat everyone equally.
Perhaps the court found the discrimination "reprehensible" because,
although childrearing is theoretically a gender-neutral task, treating it as
such appears to be having a disproportionate impact on women. The
court, however, did not address the disparate impact theory.
B. Leaves of Absence for Mothers in the Workplace
There is some irony in mothers having to sue for breastfeeding and
childcare leaves. Early cases dealing with childcare leaves involved work-
place policies that mandated pregnant women to take leaves or even
forced them to give up theirjobs. 139 Women objected to the assumption
that they could not or should not work while pregnant or caring for a
small child. 140 Women do not want to go back to mandated leaves, but
they do want the choice to have extended maternity leaves, preferably with
pay.
1. Breastfeeding Leaves
There is mounting medical evidence that breastfeeding is beneficial
for both the baby and the mother.1 41 Despite this evidence, a number of
women in the United States have had to choose between breastfeeding
136. See id.
137. See id. at 341.
138. Id. at 342 (emphasis added).
139. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 634-35 (1974)
(holding that school board policy requiring pregnant public school teachers to
take mandatory unpaid five-month maternity leave created irrebutable presump-
tion that violated Due Process clause).
140. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 543-44 (1971)
(holding that employer's policy prohibiting women, but not men, with preschool-
age children from being hired violated Title VII unless bona fide occupational
qualification could be demonstrated).
141. See Isabelle Schallreuter Olson, Comment, Out of the Mouths of Babes: No
Mother's Milk for U.S. Children. The Law and Breastfeeding, 19 HAMLINE L. REv. 269,
271-74 (1995) (citing numerous studies confirming that breastfeeding protects
mothers and children from illness and disease, and also enhances children's devel-
opmental and intelligence test scores).
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their newborn children and having a job. Some of these women unsuc-
cessfully brought suits claiming that their employers' denial of their re-
quests to take medically advised, unpaid, breastfeeding leaves violated
Title VII. One woman had been advised that her child's cleft palate re-
quired that the child be breastfed rather than bottlefed before his sur-
gery.1 42 Some women had requested six months of leave, others six weeks.
In contrast to the United States, most European countries provide at least
six months of paid maternity leave after the birth of a child. 143
In the twenty-five years since the law has become settled that employ-
ers cannot force women employees to take maternity leave, some new
mothers have sued to extend physical maternity leaves into longer-term
breastfeeding leaves. 144 Although some lower courts have found such
leaves to be a logical extension of the PDA, the trend of the cases has been
to deny breastfeeding leaves. As many cases described in this Part will
show, courts are holding that breastfeeding is not a medical condition re-
lated to pregnancy. As previously discussed, none of the courts have ana-
lyzed the phrase "not limited to" in the first clause of the PDA, that says,
"[t]he terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include but are not
limited to, because of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions .... -145 As discussed above, the courts relate gender specific
breastfeeding to gender neutral childrearing and point to some state-
ments in the legislative history that say that employers are not required to
give childcare leave, or any leave, if they are not providing leave. 146
In Board of School Directors v. Rossetti,147 conflicting opinions from the
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
142. See generally McNill v. New York City Dep't of Correction, 950 F. Supp.
564 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
143. See Kristin Downey Grimsley, Study: U.S. Mothers Face Stingy Maternity Ben-
efits; U.N. Agency Finds Disparity with Other Nations, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1998, at
A10 (reporting that in February 1997 United Nations study, United States ranked
dead last among industrialized countries in benefits and protections it offers chil-
dren). The study found that 80% of the countries studied required maternity
leave by law, one third permitted leaves lasting more than 14 weeks, and 80% re-
quired breaks for nursing mothers. See id.; see also T.R. Reid, Norway Pays a Price for
Family Values: Parents Receive Stipends to Stay Home With Children, WASH. POST, Nov. 1,
1998, at A26 (discussing Norway's parental leave policy paying parent who leaves
job to raise child 80% of his or her regular salary during first 12 months of child's
life and about $5,000 to stay at home during child's second year).
144. See LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 644 (establishing that employers cannot force
employees to take maternity leave). But see O'Hara v. Mt. Vernon Bd. of Educ., 16
F. Supp. 2d 868, 886-87 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (holding that collective bargaining
agreement that allowed employees taking disability leave, including disability preg-
nancy leave, to return to work at any point after termination of the disability, but
prohibited employees taking nondisability parental leave from returning until fol-
lowing school year unless permission were granted, did not violate Title VII be-
cause men and women treated same and there was insufficient evidence of
disparate impact).
145. 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k) (1994). (emphasis added).
146. See id.
147. 387 A.2d 957 (Pa. Commw. 1978), rev'd, 411 A.2d 486 (Pa. 1979).
1999]
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analyzed a request for a breastfeeding leave. 148 Unfortunately, the view
that prevailed penalized, instead of celebrated, a woman for breastfeeding
her child. In Rossetti, an employee asked to extend her eight weeks of paid
physical disability maternity leave or discretionary unpaid childrearing to
breastfeed her child in accordance with her doctor's recommendation,
specifically to protect her child from her allergies. 149 The school board
denied the request. When she did not return to work after the expiration
of her maternity leave, she was dismissed. 150 The Pennsylvania Secretary
of Education, however, overturned the school board's decision and or-
dered that the employee be reinstated to her teaching position.1 51 The
school board appealed the Secretary's decision. 152
The Commonwealth Court's majority opinion held that the school
board had discriminated against the employee in violation of Penn-
sylvania's Human Relations Act (PHRA), which prohibits sex discrimina-
tion by refusing to grant unpaid leave. 153 The court reasoned that
because its Supreme Court had interpreted that law to prohibit mandatary
resignations by pregnant women based on the premise that only women
can become pregnant, then "it follows that the request for additional leave
for breastfeeding purposes under the circumstances of this case is merely a
logical and natural extension of that concept."1 54 The dissent would have
denied the leave as a matter of law, relying on a Pennsylvania regulation
that provided "[n]othing in these regulations shall prohibit an employ-
ment policy that permits granting of leave for purposes of childbearing
beyond the period of actual disability, but such leave shall not include
148. Compare Rosetti, 387 A.2d at 959-60 (deciding that employer could not
properly deny request for breastfeeding leave), with Board of Sch. Dirs. v. Rosetti,
411 A.2d 486, 488-89 (Pa. 1979) (reversing lower court).
149. See Rosetti, 397 A.2d at 958, 958 n.1. According to the Commonwealth
court, the child was apparently unable to take breastmilk from a bottle. See id. at
959 ("As a result, unless the child was to be fed intraveneously or by a stomach
tube, his sole means of nourishment was breastfeeding."). The Supreme Court,
however, found that the school board had disbelieved that the baby rejected bot-
tle-feeding. See Rosetti, 411 A.2d at 488 n.4.
150. See Rosetti, 397 A.2d at 958-59.
151. See id. at 958.
152. See id. at 957.
153. See id. at 960. Section 5(a) of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act
provides that:
it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice, unless based upon a bona
fide occupational qualification .... (a) for any employer, because of...
sex.., to refuse to hire or employ, or to bar or to discharge from employ-
ment such individual, or to otherwise discriminate against such individual
with respect to compensation, hire, tenure, terms, conditions or privi-
leges of employment if the individual is the best able and most competent
to perform the services required.
Rosetti, 411 A.2d at 131 n.6 (quoting 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 955(a) (1998)).
154. Rosetti, 387 A.2d at 960.
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payment of sickness or disability benefits."1 55 The dissent further con-
cluded that this regulation recognizes "that there is nothing in [PHRA]
that requires the inclusion of childrearing leave with maternity leave.
1 56
it is odd, however, to interpret a regulation that does not prohibit unpaid
childrearing leave as one justifying a denial of that leave for breastfeeding.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed with the lower court's dis-
sent.15 7 Although the relevant collective bargaining agreement permitted
maternity leave to be extended if a mother's health required it, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court held that her health did not include the health of
the child. 158 The court also held that the PHRA did not require employ-
ers to provide leaves for childrearing, noting that:
[A] ppellee has in no way suggested that male teachers have been
or would be granted discretionary leaves of absence While fe-
males were denied them. To the contrary, appellee has been
treated no differently than any male teacher would be who had to
remain at home to care for a physically or emotionally disabled
newborn infant.15
9
In other words, both men and women would be fired if they required an
extended leave to care for a newborn. Not surprisingly, few men had
sought to stay home to breastfeed a baby. The majority did not seem to
recognize the irony of its own logic when it stated that "[w]hile choosing
between the health-care needs of one's child and keeping one's job may
be a difficult choice, appellee did choose to remain at home." 160 Thus,
although the majority concluded that men and women will not be treated
differently under this policy, they also appear to acknowledge that denying
breastfeeding leave to women makes women face choices that men do not
have to face and, ultimately, renders women unequal in the workplace.
Similar irony had existed in the lower court's dissent, which was fol-
lowed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Despite calling plaintiff's deci-
sion to breastfeed her child "laudable" and "admirable," that dissent had
said that her decision was "one [for] which she, and not the District, must
bear the consequences."1 61 Neither the dissent nor the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court explained why taking care of children should be an indi-
vidual, and not a societal, concern.
155. Id. at 961 (Mencer, J., dissenting) (quoting 16 PA. CODE § 41.104(a) and
referring to § 41.103(a) as requiring pregnancy and childbirth to be treated as
temporary disabilities are treated).
156. Id. at 960-61 (Mencer, J., dissenting).
157. See generally Rosetti, 411 A.2d 486.
158. See id. at 489 n.7. The court also noted that the union had been unsuc-
cessful in negotiating childcare provision in collective bargaining agreement. See
id. at 489 n.7.
159. Id. at 489 (emphasis added).
160. Id. at 489 n.8.
161. Board of Sch. Dirs. v. Rosetti, 387 A.2d 957, 960-61 (Pa. Commw. 1978),
rev'd 411 A.2d 486 (Pa. 1979) (Mencer, J., dissenting).
1999]
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One problem with classifying breastfeeding leaves as either due to the
disability of pregnancy or for childrearing is that breastfeeding does not fit
either description. Breastfeeding is not disabling, but it does require time
with the baby (or if it is done not as nature designed, time with a pump);
on the other hand, it is not gender neutral, similar to pregnancy disability.
Childrearing leave, in contrast, is not related to breastfeeding and is gen-
der neutral. The court seems to ignore the biological, reproductive differ-
ences between men and women that follows the birth of a child.
Recognizing this problem, the dissenting Pennsylvania Supreme
Court opinion would have affirmed the Commonwealth Court's decision
that this breastfeeding leave was required by the PHRA, stating that the
majority's reasoning "ignores the obvious reality that only women can per-
form the breastfeeding function" and, thus, the school board was "discrim-
inating on the basis of sex" when it denied the breastfeeding leave. 162
Ten years later, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reached the same result as the Rossetti court. In Barrash v.
Bowen,163 a woman was discharged for taking a six-month breastfeeding
leave based on her pediatrician's recommendation.1 64 Her employer, the
Social Security Administration (SSA), had once given six-month maternity
leaves, but had tightened its leave policy prior to the plaintiffs preg-
nancy.165 In this case, the SSA extended plaintiffs leave to more than five
months, but discharged her when she did not return after that time. 16 6
When plaintiff sued, claiming that her discharge was unconstitutional and
violated the applicable collective bargaining agreement, the district court
held that the new, shorter leave policy had a disparate impact on mothers
wishing to breastfeed.1
67
The Fourth Circuit, in a per curiam opinion reversed, with language
that reflects hostility toward women's claims for leaves of this type:
There was data showing that several women received maternity
leave without pay of six months or more in 1983. The figure de-
clined in 1984, and no such extended leaves were granted in
1985. Those figures were compared with figures showing that
the number of men on sick leave of six months or more in-
162. Rosetti, 411 A.2d at 489-90 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
163. 846 F.2d 927 (4th Cir. 1988).
164. See id. at 928. The doctor admitted, however, that the recommendation
was his routine prescription, presumably believing that this was best for the health
of all newborn children. See id. at 928-29.
165. See id. at 928 (noting that at time of plaintiff's first pregnancy, SSA had
granted her six-month maternity leave to breastfeed her child).
166. See id. at 930 (highlighting testimony from pediatrician that terminating
breastfeeding after five months would have no adverse impact on child and fact
that SSA extended plaintiffs request for leave based on her own post-partum ill-
ness, although it was "apparent that [her] claims of incapacity were insufficiently
documented").
167. See id. at 928, 929.
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creased over the same three year period, but the data was not
comparable. The men were incapacitated, while the women
were not. If the required documentation was provided, the men
were entitled to the sick leave they received, while maternity
leave without pay was not available as a matter of right but only
on a discretionary basis. One can draw no valid comparison between
people, male and female, suffering extended incapacity from illness or
injury and young mothers wishing to nurse little babies.a68
This comment trivializes the care of infants. It relegates breastfeeding to
the private sphere of home and assumes that a woman's "choice" to have
children and to exercise the celebrated biological function of breastfeed-
ing is also a choice to put her job at risk. 169 As long as women need to
choose between having a child and having a job, they cannot be truly
equal with men in the workplace. The court correctly notes that people
with illnesses should not have to lose their jobs because of lost time from
work. What the court does not see is that women who have children need
that same accommodation in order to be equal to men in the workplace
who have children.
The Fourth Circuit, confusing the distinction between disparate im-
pact and disparate treatment theories, held further that:
Any limitation upon the liberality with which leave without pay
had been granted in earlier years would have an adverse impact
upon young mothers wishing to nurse their babies for six
months, but that is not the kind of disparate impact that would
invalidate the rule, for it shows no less favorable treatment of
women than of men.
170
This insistence upon comparing women and men who breastfeed seems as
sensible as the pregnant versus nonpregnant people distinction in General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert, a case that was reversed by the PDA. 171 Although
there may be women and men who have children and do not breastfeed
them, there are no men who have children and do breastfeed,just as there
are no men who become pregnant. Because Congress reversed the rea-
soning of Gilbert when it passed the PDA, presumably Congress did not
intend to see the reasoning in it reemerge in a similar context.1 72
168. Id. at 931-32 (emphasis added).
169. See Joan Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797, 825-35
(1989) (explaining that women's choices are imposed by workplace that is
designed around worker who can devote substantial time to job because his wife is
devoting substantial time to home).
170. Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927, 932 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing no authority
to support court's position). For a further discussion of disparate treatment and
disparate impact, see supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
171. For a further discussion of the holding of Gilbert and the interplay be-
tween it and the PDA, see supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
172. See S. REP. No. 95-331, at 7-8 (1978) (stating that "bill is merely reestab-
lishing the law as it was understood prior to Gilbert by the EEOC and by the lower
1999]
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In Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 1 7 3 a new mother requested an additional
six-week leave because her child refused to take breast milk from a bot-
tle.' 7 4 The United States District Court for the Western District of Ken-
tucky characterized her claim as one of disparate impact, but found that
her discharge for taking that leave was not discriminatory. 1 75 Although
noting that the PDA does not define the term "related medical condi-
tions,"1 76 the court concluded that " [w] hile it may be that breast-feeding
and weaning are natural concomitants of pregnancy and childbirth, they
are not 'medical conditions' related thereto.' 77 The court said that its
"conclusion is mandated by the plain language of the act" and by its his-
tory. 1 78 The court added that "[n]othing in the PDA or Title VII itself,
obliges an employer to accommodate the child-care concerns of breast-
feeding women. If Congress had wanted these sorts of child-care concerns
to be covered in Title VII or the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, it could
have included them in the plain language of the statute."1 79
Once again, this court did not address the "not limited to" "plain lan-
guage."1 80 It would seem that breastfeeding could fit into that catch-all.
The court concluded that "[n]othing in the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act, or Title VII, obliges employers to accommodate the child-care con-
cerns of breast-feeding female workers by providing additional breast-feed-
ing leave not available to male workers.' 18 1 Once again, this is an odd
statement because men obviously cannot breastfeed and would not re-
quest such a leave. Not surprisingly, men are not requesting breastfeeding
leave. Perhaps courts are afraid that men will request comparable time
with their children. Perhaps they will and should.' 8 2 The third case of my
courts"); see also H.R. RE. No. 95-948, at 2 (1978) (same). Proponents of the bill
repeatedly emphasized that the Supreme Court had erroneously interpreted Con-
gressional intent and that amending legislation was necessary to reestablish the
principles of Title VII law as they had been understood prior to the Gilbert deci-
sion. See id. Many of them expressly agreed with the view of the dissenting justices
in Gilbert. See id.
173. 789 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Ky. 1990), affd, 951 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1991).
174. See id. at 868.
175. See id. at 869.
176. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994). For the text of this statute, see supra
note 62.
177. Wallace, 789 F. Supp. at 869.
178. Id. at 869 (emphasis added). For a further discussion of the legislative
history, see supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
179. Id. at 870.
180. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (emphasis added).
181. Wallace, 789 F. Supp. at 870. See generally Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc.,
960 F. Supp. 1487 (D. Colo. 1997) (quoting Wallace extensively to grant employer's
motion for summary judgment that employer did not violate PDA by denying
blackjack dealer part-time schedule to breastfeed newborn child, but denied em-
ployer's motions with respect to Family and Medical Leave Act and pendant state
claim).
182. For a discussion of cases in which fathers have sought paternity leave, see
supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
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three case theory would allow men to request this childrearing time.1 83
Perhaps that would be expensive for employers, but perhaps it would not,
as family-friendly policies may reap benefits that outweigh costs.
18 4
In McNill v. New York City Department of Correction,185 a corrections of-
ficer claimed that her downgraded employment status for excessive absen-
teeism was discriminatory because her leaves were related to her
pregnancy.' 8 6 The corrections officer contended that because it was med-
ically necessary that she nurse her baby until surgery could correct a cleft
palate, her absences were pregnancy related.'8 7 The United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, relying on Wallace, held that
her leave was not a medical condition related to pregnancy.' 88 As in Wal-
lace, the court parsed the meaning of "pregnancy, childbirth and related
medical condition," but neglected "not limited to."' 89 Although noting
that the correction officer's case was distinguishable from other
breastfeeding cases because of the medical necessity involved, 190 the court
concluded that:
[T] here can be no issue that there are many children who suffer
from serious birth defects and that for many of these children,
their mother is, for all practical purposes, absolutely essential to
their survival. If plaintiff's claim here is covered by the PDA,
then a multitude of mothers who have left work involuntarily to
attend to their children's medical needs would also have claims.
I am unwilling to infer that Congress intended such a broad ex-
pansion of the scope of Title VII from the fairly narrow language
of the PDA. 19 1
A case that would grant leaves in this narrow context of medically essential
breatfeeding would not appear to cause others to roll down a slippery
slope. The court, however, enlarged the potential impact of its decision
from mothers who would be required to breastfeed a child to "a multitude
183. For a discussion of how Newport News requires benefits provided to wo-
men to be extended to men, see supra notes 79-82.
184. For a survey of studies showing that benefits can outweigh costs of family-
friendly policies, see Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 2, at 905 n.337.
185. 950 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
186. See id. at 569.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 569-71.
189. See id. at 569 (relying on dictionary definitions of pregnancy and child-
birth to conclude that "conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth would di-
rectly involve the condition of the mother" and not her child's malformed lip.").
The district court also quoted from the House Report. See id.
190. McNill, 950 F. Supp. at 570 ("Admittedly, none of these cases are perfect
analogues. In none of them was there a medical necessity that the child be breast-
fed, a function which can only be performed by a newborn's mother."). Despite
distinguishing those cases, the district court had quoted from Wallace and Barnes
and relied on Barrash to reach its conclusion. See id. at 570-71.
191. McNill, 950 F. Supp. at 571 (footnote omitted).
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of mothers who have left work involuntarily to attend to their children's
medical needs."192 In enlarging this impact, however, the court identified
only women-note its use of the word "mothers," not "fathers." But in
enlarging the issue from breastfeeding to other "medical needs," the
proper term should have been "parents." By not using the word "parents,"
the court is implicitly recognizing that mothers, more than fathers, are
taking leaves to care for medical emergencies of children, but the court
did not address that disparate impact. 193 Until the workplace can allow
both men and women to take medical leaves to care for their children,
more women will be disadvantaged, as further seen in the section
below.194
2. Childcare Leave
Courts deny childcare leaves on the ground that they are not sex
based. As a result, however, more women than men are leaving the work-
place or working in low-paying jobs. 19 5 One would think, therefore, that
this policy of denying leave has a sex-based disparate impact on women,
which under Title VII would require employers to change the practice for
both men and women or prove that it is a business necessity. 196
In 1985, the Eastern District of New York, in Record v. Mill Neck Manor
Lutheran School,197 held that the PDA "does not protect people wishing to
take childrearing leaves, as opposed to women wishing to take pregnancy
leaves .... A disservice is done to both men and women to assume that
child-rearing is a function peculiar to one sex."1 98 Indeed it is a disservice
to assume that childrearing is women's work. But to whom in this case is a
disservice done by that assumption? So long as more women than men
take childrearing leaves, a lack of childrearing leaves will have a disparate
impact on women. Apparently because of a pleading mishap, the court
did not have to address a disparate impact claim. 199
Record involved an art teacher who had taken a two year leave of ab-
sence with her first child and who requested another year of leave as she
was planning another pregnancy and did not want to disrupt the school
192. Id.
193. For studies showing that more mothers than fathers take childcare leave,
see supra note 68. For four cases in which fathers attempted to take paternity
leave, see supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of
disparate impact, see supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
194. Although the FMLA does require that some employers provide some un-
paid leaves, for a discussion of the limitations of the Act, see supra note 4.
195. For studies that compare women's and men's participation in the
workforce, see supra note 67.
196. For a discussion of the remedy in a disparate impact case, see supra notes
52-59 and accompanying text.
197. 611 F. Supp. 905 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
198. Id. at 907.
199. See id. ("Plaintiff does not claim that defendant's actions have a disparate
impact on women .... ).
,[Vol. 44: p. 355
30
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol44/iss3/4
LITIGATING AGAINST EMPLOYMENT PENALTIES
year.200 She became pregnant, but was denied further childcare leave;
instead, she was offered ajob as a woodworking instructor with subsequent
pregnancy disability leave when her second child was born.2 0 ' She de-
clined and was told her job teaching art would not be renewed.2 02 The
court found that the reason the school offered her the woodworking job
was because her pregnancy leave would disrupt that class less than the art
class and found that reason not to be pretextual. 20 3 Inability to prove pre-
text prevented plaintiff from establishing a prima facie case of disparate
treatment by presumption.20 4 The court was careful to note that the dis-
ruption the school feared was not from' a pregnancy leave, but from a
longer childcare leave that it anticipated she would take after the child was
born.2 0 5 There is some inconsistency with this reasoning, however. Be-
cause the school had denied additional childcare leave, the school would
not be faced with childcare leave interruption, unless she quit. But she
wanted her job.
At first reflection, Record may appear an unsympathetic case for plain-
tiff because, after all, she wanted a third year of leave (for a second child).
There is, however, a statute that provides veterans with five years of job
protection. 20 6 Could not raising the future generation be an important
societal issue as is domestic and international security? The judge raised a
similar question by mentioning an issue not before the court-whether
childcare leave protection should be provided as it is for jury duty leave. 20 7
In a 1989 decision, Payseur v. W W Grainger, Inc.,20 8 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois also held that an em-
ployer who denied childcare leaves to two women had not discriminated
against them under Title VII as amended by the PDA.20 9 Relying on Rec-
200. See id. at 906.
201. See id. at 906-07.
202. See id. at 907.
203. See id.
204. For further discussion of proving disparate treatment presumptions, see
supra note 52 and accompanying text.
205. Record, 611 F. Supp. at 907 ("There is no evidence that [the] decision to
offer plaintiff the woodworking position and to terminate her were based on [her]
desire to take a pregnancy leave .... The problem of class and faculty disruption
was caused by plaintiff's desire to take a leave of absence to raise the child.").
206. See Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of
1994, 38 U.S.C. § 4312 (a) (1998) (providing members of uniformed services reem-
ployment rights and benefits for cumulative period of five years); see also Kovacic-
Fleischer, supra note 2, at 888 (noting that protecting jobs of those taking military
absences could be model for protecting jobs of those taking childrearing
absences).
207. Record, 611 F. Supp. at 907 (noting that "[w]hether leaves for child-rear-
ing should be protected from employer discrimination, as leaves for jury duty are,
is not a question for this court to determine").
208. Nos. 88-C5707, 88-5708, 1989 WL 152583(N.D. Ill., Nov. 28, 1989) (unre-
ported opinion), 52 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 789, 53 EMPL. PRAc. DEC. P
39,938.
209. See id. at *2 (granting employer's motion for summary judgment).
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ord, the court stated that "[t] here is nothing inherently sex-related about
child-care ... either parent, may care for a child."2 10 It followed, the
court reasoned, that "new mothers, as individuals seeking childcare leave"
and as distinguished from pregnant women, "are not members of a pro-
tected group." 211 Because the court reasoned that new mothers are not a
protected class, it held that these mothers could not bring a disparate im-
pact claim against their employer. 212 Nevertheless, the court equated the
phrase "new mothers" with the gender-neutral category of "individuals
seeking childcare leave," despite the fact that the court noted that no new
fathers were seeking the leave. 213 As discussed above, although childcare
leave could be sought by both men and women, it appears to be sought
more often by women, and its denial disparately impacts them. There is a
catch-22 here because the hostility of the case law toward mothers seeking
leave may well discourage many fathers from seeking such leave, perpetu-
ating disparate impact against mothers. 214
The court in Payseur alternatively held that even if new mothers were
a protected class, the statistics would not support a disparate impact
claim. 215 The court noted that thirteen women and two men sought
leaves from the employer.2 16 The employer granted nine of the women
and both of the men leaves. 21 7 Therefore, the court found that "[t]hese
disparities fall far short of what would be necessary to create an inference
of discriminatory impact because both the sample size and the alleged ef-
fect are statistically insignificant."2 18 The court, however, did not analyze
the statistics as a percentage of requested leaves granted. For example,
even though numerically the employer granted more leaves to women
than men, it granted leaves to one hundred percent of the men who re-
quested them, but only to sixty-nine percent of the women.2 19 The court's
disparate impact analysis considered only the composition of the defend-
ing employer's workplace and the events occurring within it.220 But even
210. Id. at *1.
211. Id.
212. See id. at *2 (stating that to establish "prima facie case of discrimination
under a disparate impact theory a plaintiff must show through significant statistical
disparity that a facially neutral employment practice has a discriminatory impact
on a protected class"). For a further discussion of disparate impact theory, see
supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
213. See Payseur, 1989 WL 152583, at *1.
214. For a discussion of three cases involving fathers seeking paternity leave,
see supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
215. See Payseur, 1989 WL 152583, at *2 (stating that "plaintiff must show
through significant statistical disparity" that employment practice has discrimina-





220. Compare id. at *2, with Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1977)(holding national statistics on height and weight permitted to determine whether
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within that framework, the court did not discuss the types of leaves allowed
and why. The court did not appear to recognize that denying childrearing
leaves, given the current structure .of society, impacts women more than
men.
Five years later, Barnes v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 22 1 involved a sales repre-
sentative who claimed that she had been discriminated against on the ba-
sis of sex when she returned to work after taking the four-month "personal
leave" permitted by her employer to care for medical problems of new-
born twins. 222 Although the leave was permitted by company policy, the
sales representative was demoted, and the employer filled subsequent
openings for new sales representatives with men.223 The United States
District Court for the District of Maryland, relying upon legislative history,
EEOC Guidelines and some of the breastfeeding cases described above,
held as a matter of law that discrimination for taking a childcare leave, as
opposed to medical pregnancy leave, was not covered by the PDA.224 The
court concluded that caring for a child is not a medical condition, stating
"[h]owever logical it may be to argue, as [plaintiff] does, that parental
leave following maternity leave is gender-based and thus protected under
Title VII, that proposition has been consistently rejected from the out-
set."225 Perhaps the rejection of the logical position by most, but not all
judges, has not itself been logical. 226
prison's height and weight restrictions had disparate impact on women). For a
discussion of Dothard, see supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
221. 846 F. Supp. 442 (D. Md. 1994).
222. See id. at 443 (quoting employer policy that permitted "birth mother" to
take maximum four-month parental leave after medical pregnancy leave as "per-
sonal leave," not extension of medical leave).
223. See id.
224. See id. at 443-44 (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 5 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4753). It stated that ninety-five percent of pregnant wo-
men need six or fewer weeks of leave, other five percent with medical complica-
tions should be covered as are employer's disabled workers, and childcare is not a
"medically determined condition related to pregnancy." Id. It also stated that
childcare leaves are to be treated as are nonmedical leaves. See id. at 444 (quoting
from 29 C.F.R § 1604.18A (1984)); see also id. at 444-45 (quoting from Record, Wal-
lace and Barrash and citing Payseur). For a further discussion of the conflicting
legislative history of the PDA, see supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
225. Barnes, 846 F. Supp. at 443. The court's care to exclude pregnancy leave
from its analysis might indicate that this court would have decided Troupe, which
held that planning to take pregnancy leave was not protected by the PDA, differ-
ently than did the Seventh Circuit. For a further discussion of Troupe, see supra
notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
226. Cf O'Hara v. Mount Vernon Bd. of Educ., 16 F. Supp. 2d 868, 885-86
(1998) (evaluating teacher's claim that school's parental leave policy discriminates
against women because it requires them to take off remainder of school year
whereas disability leave does not). The OHara court, specifically rejecting the
logic of Barnes, stated that parental leave is protected under Title VII as discrimina-
tion based on sex, irrespective of the PDA and that the proper comparison group
is between women and men taking parental leave. See id. at 885-86. The court
ultimately rejected the plaintiffs disparate impact claim, however, because she had
no statistics to prove that men had ever taken parental leave, and thus no way to
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The judge in Barnes did not recognize that the plaintiff was claiming
that she was discriminated against for taking a company leave offered to
mothers. The court did not even ask, as did the court in Troupe that same
year and month,227 whether any nonpregnant people were given similar
leaves and then not demoted. Nor did the court ask whether fathers were
not given similar leaves (which would discriminate against them). If fa-
thers are not allowed to take childcare leave, but mothers are, but are then
demoted for taking it, then this employment policy would appear to have
a disparate impact on mothers. As will be seen below, a few courts recog-
nize this.
IV. APPLYING THE THREE-CASE THEORY TO PREGNANCY, BREASTFEEDING
AND CHILDREARING LEAVE CASES
A few lower court cases have applied the reasoning with respect to
reproductive differences between men and women that was later em-
ployed by the Supreme Court in United States v. Virginia. In 1981, before
Guerra and United States v. Virginia were decided, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held in Abraham v. Graphic
Arts International Union,228 without requiring statistical evidence that was
demanded by so many cases described in Part III, above, that an em-
ployer's policy of providing no more than ten days of sick leave for any
temporary employee had a disparate impact on women. The court re-
versed the summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs claim that she was
fired from her job with the union because of her pregnancy. 229 The Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit held that too many facts were in dispute to allow
the trial court to rely on the union's allegations that the plaintiff lacked
the qualifications to resume her job, which had been "redefined" while
she was on maternity leave. 230 The court stated that "the work absence
incidental to her impending motherhood loomed as a likely explanation
for her discharge. '23 1
In addition, the court decided that a trial was necessary to determine
whether the employer's policy that granted temporary employees, such as
show that they were treated more favorably than women. See id. at 886-87. Further,
the court noted that a man's choice to take parental leave is a family choice which
"is not the fault of the defendants." Id. at 887 n.18. The employers' "fault" is in
not adjusting for the celebrated differences between the people in its employ. Un-
fortunately, the court narrowed the possibility of finding discrimination by not
recognizing that the difference between men's and women's "choices" demon-
strates the disparate impact. The court begins its analysis well, but then misses the
point that the disparate impact occurs from that lack of a comparison group.
227. See Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 734 (7th Cir. 1994). For
a further discussion of Troupe see supra notes 111-23. Both Troupe and Barnes were
decided in March 1994.
228. 660 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
229. See id. at 815-16.
230. See id. at 816.
231. Id. at 817.
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plaintiff, only a ten-day leave for a medical disability, including pregnancy,
had a disparate impact on pregnant women,2 32 and the court referred to
the fact that all temporary employees received the same disability benefits
as only a "slight variant" from the prohibition against employers from ex-
cluding pregnancy benefits from employees' benefit packages.23 3 The
court noted that an unlawful employment practice is discharging "any in-
dividual ... because of such individual's... sex," 2 3 4 and that:
Tide VII outlaws any detrimental visitation on employees of
either sex "because of their differing roles in the 'scheme of
human existence' . . . . Tide VII cannot be read "to permit an
employer to burden female employees in such a way as to deprive
them of employment opportunities because of their different
role."235
The court emphasized that ten days was an inadequate period of time
to bear a child and was thus discriminatory, 236 saying, "while many female
as well as male employees could have held a [temporary] job without any
problem at all, any such jobholder confronted by childbirth was doomed
to almost certain termination. Oncoming motherhood was virtually tanta-
mount to dismissal .... In short, the ten-day absolute ceiling on disability
leave portended a drastic effect on women employees of childbearing
age-an impact no male would ever encounter."2 37 The court concluded,
therefore, that the leave policy had a disparate impact on women employ-
ees of childbearing age. 238
The court then said that the argument that the maximum ten-day
leave policy was justified on the ground that the project on which plaintiff
had been employed was one of short term "clashes violently with the letter
as well as the spirit of Tide VII." 23 9
Relying on an EEOC Guideline, the court further said:
An employer can incur a Title VII violation as much by lack of an
adequate leave policy as by unequal application of a policy it does
have. Title VII outlaws employment discrimination traceable to
an employee's gender, and it takes little imagination to see an
232. See id. at 818-19.
233. Id. at 818.
234. Id. at 817 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976)).
235. Id. at 818 (holding that Title VII prohibits burdening women because of
pregnancy, distinguishing "benefit" that could be withheld under Gilbert) (foot-
notes omitted) (quoting Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977)).
236. See id. at 819 (suggesting that in 95% of pregnancies six-week maternity
leave was adequate) (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 5 (1978)).
237. Id. (citing Nashville Gas, 434 U.S. at 142).
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omission may in particular circumstances be as invidious as posi-
tive action. 240
This reasoning makes sense because policies that penalize women for hav-
ing children may influence either job-related or family-size decisions of all
women of childbearing age and may have influenced decisions of women
who have already had, or decided not to have children.
Abraham was favorably cited in dicta by one 1991 Seventh Circuit case,
Maganuco v. Lyden,24 1 and by a 1993 Illinois district court case, Cnokrak v.
Evangelical Health Systems Corp., 24 2 which had also cited the "noted
scholar," Dean Kay. Those dicta appear to have been rejected three years
later by the Seventh Circuit in Troupe, which explicitly rejected the reason-
ing of Dean Herma Hill Kay and subtly contradicted Maganuco.243
In 1996, fifteen years after Abraham and a few months after United
States v. Virginia, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas in Roberts v. United States Postmaster General,244 relied on Abraham and
denied an employer's motion to dismiss, holding that "[w]hile an em-
ployer can violate Title VII by applying unequally a policy it does have, an
employer can also violate Title VII by failing to provide an adequate pol-
icy; a policy which on its face is neutral, but which has a disparate impact
on women."24 5 In that case, a woman had been using her accumulated
sick leave to care for her premature infant until her employer changed its
policy to restrict use of sick leave to cases in which only the employee was
ill.2 46 In denying the employer's motion to dismiss plaintiff's disparate
impact claim, the court said "It]he plaintiff.., argues that.., women are
forced to resign more often than men because of their more frequent role
as child-rearers, and the failure of the defendant to allow employees to
take time off to care for children disparately impacts women. This court's
240. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(c) (1979)) (footnote omitted). Section
1604.10(c) states, "where the termination of an employee who is temporarily dis-
abled is caused by an employment policy under which insufficient or no leave is
available, such a termination violates the Act if it has a disparate impact on employ-
ment of one sex and is not justified by business necessity." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(c).
Presumably, however, an affirmative defense of business necessity is also an issue of
fact to be decided at trial.
241. 939 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1991). Maganuco found that the school district's
leave policy did not have a disparate impact on pregnant women, even though the
policy did not permit following paid sick leave with unpaid leave causing pregnant
women to lose paid leave if they took leave beyond their disability. See id. at 444.
The court found that the employer had enough leave available for the physical
pregnancy disability and therefore said, "[t]his is not to say that a policy which
does not provide adequate leave [for pregnancy] might not be vulnerable under a
disparate impact theory." (citing Abraham and Miller Wohl Co. v. Graphics Arts Int'l
Union, 515 F. Supp. 1264, vacated, 685 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1982).
242. 819 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
243. See Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d at 738 (7th Cir. 1994).
244. 947 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
245. Id. at 289.
246. See id. at 284.
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analysis is consistent with the equality theory I derived from United States v.
Virginia, Guerra and Newport News and described in Part III above. It is
exactly this type of harm that Title VII seeks to redress. 247 But, as the cases
in Part III illustrate, it is exactly this type of harm that frequently is not
redressed.
Other maverick district courts differed from the cases discussed in
Part III, above, by not looking for nonpregnant people with similar leave
requirements who are treated more favorably than the plaintiffs or by not
removing new mothers from the protection of the PDA. The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa in 1987, in Packard-
Knutson v. Mutual Life Insurance Co.,2 4 8 found that a woman discharged
after taking maternity leave was discriminated against on the basis of preg-
nancy by looking at the timing of the discharge as one factor in conclud-
ing that plaintiffs discharge was because of pregnancy. The court said, "It
was not until after the birth of plaintiffs baby that defendant began to
complain of her alleged lack of production."249 The court also found de-
fendant's explanation that it fired her for lack of production pretextual
because another employee, who had not been on leave, but who had low
production, was not treated as severely. 250
Nine years later, the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado, in Donaldson v. American Banco Corp. 25 1 explicitly rejected an
employer's argument that Title VII does not "protect parents caring for
small children from being fired because that is a gender-neutral prob-
lem."252 The court refused to dismiss the claims of three plaintiffs, saying
that the PDA:
[D]oes not specify whether the discrimination must occur during
the pregnancy.... It would make little sense to prohibit an em-
ployer from firing a woman during her pregnancy but permit the
employer to terminate her the day after delivery if the reason for
termination was that the woman became pregnant in the first
place. The plain language of the statute does not require it, and
common sense precludes it.2 5
3
247. See id.
248. 668 F. Supp. 1261 (N.D. Iowa 1987).
249. Id. at 1266.
250. See id.
251. 945 F. Supp. 1456 (D. Colo. 1996).
252. Id. at 1463.
253. Id. at 1464. In addition, the court cited yet another statement from legis-
lative history from Representative Sarasin that conflicts with that relied on by some
of the cases in Part III. See id. For further discussion of legislative history, see supra
notes 93-97. Donaldson also declined to follow Maganuco, 939 F.2d 400 (7th Cir.
1991), which, despite language favorable to pregnant employees, had held that a
plaintiff needing a long leave because of complications from childbirth would not
be protected by the PDA. See id. at 445. The court in Donaldson said, "to the extent
that Maganuco, can be read to state a general rule that pregnancy is only to be
treated as a disability, I decline to follow it." Donaldson, 945 F. Supp. at 1464.
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As can be seen by comparing the cases described in this Part with
those in Part III, above, the courts disagree as to what "makes sense." The
cases discussed in this Part do not represent the current mainstream of
lower court cases, but they should. The cases described in Part III above
indicate that many courts are not celebrating, but rather are denigrating,
women's reproductive differences and, as a result, are limiting women's
employment opportunities. Not all lower courts, and not all judges in the
cases described in Part III agree that Title VII permits this limitation. The
logic of those judges is consistent with the theory derived from the three
United States Supreme Court cases.
Because women's and men's natural reproductive roles are not going
to change, without employment adjustments women frequently will be dis-
advantaged and society will be disadvantaged by the resulting "brain
drain."2 54 Presumably society does not want to discourage all women from
having children, nor should women be made to feel that they must give up
natural biological functions, such as having children and breastfeeding, in
order to work. As the Supreme Court held in 1996, women's differences
from men should be celebrated, not denigrated. 2 55
Applying the three-case theory, courts could conclude, as did Abraham
and Roberts, that denying adequate pregnancy leave denigrates women.
Courts could also conclude that penalizing an employee for taking preg-
nancy leave or for absences related to pregnancy denigrates women, re-
gardless of whether nonpregnant people are treated similarly.
In addition, courts should not require women to abandon the biologi-
cal function of breastfeeding, another difference that should be cele-
brated, in order to keep a job. Accommodations for breastfeeding should
be manageable for employers. If not, employers can prove that failure to
provide such accommodations is a necessity to their business, but the ben-
efits from such accommodations might make that proof difficult.
256 If
leaves are not possible, there are other alternatives than making a woman
choose between breastfeeding her child and her job, such as telecommut-
ing, bringing the baby to work, flexible schedules or time for expressing
milk on the job.25 7
Finally, employers should provide adequate childcare leave or accom-
modations, so that women are not disparately impacted on a societal basis
for having children. 258 Then, the leaves or accommodations could also be
254. See Eva A. Cicoria, Note, Pregnancy and Equality: Precarious Alliance, 60 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1345, 1349 (1987) (describing women's participation in workforce).
255. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) ("'Inherent differ-
ences' between men and women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for
celebration, but not for denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial
constraints on an individual's opportunity.").
256. For a survey of studies of the cost effectiveness of family-friendly policies,
see generally Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 2.
257. See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 2, at 905-07 (discussing types of possible
family-friendly employer accommodations).
258. See id.
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extended to men, as described in Newport News. When this happens, stere-
otypical notions of parenting could begin to break down. 259 Currently, it
is not easy for fathers to ask for parenting leaves when the cases are so
hostile to such leaves. But when fathers as well as mothers are able to have
time with children, it will come from society having celebrated their repro-
ductive differences without denigrating either women or men. The as-
sumption that childcare is not a function of the workplace could be
eroded and society could acknowledge the importance of broad-based
support, including workplace support, for raising future generations of
healthy, intelligent and well-adjusted children.
259. See id. at 912-15 (discussing how family-friendly policies could reduce so-
cietally entrenched differences between sexes).
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